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Recent Development
1987 Review of the European Economic
Community Council and Commission:
Securities Regulation, Franchising
Agreements, and Knowhow Licensing
This article analyzes significant recent legal developments emanat-
ing from the Council and Commission of the European Economic
Community (EEC or Community), focusing on areas of practical
importance to the international practitioner.' The article is divided
into three independent segments which study different areas of law.
Each segment summarizes the state of the law, analyzes recent
Community action, and explores the implications of the action for
the transnational lawyer. The areas selected for review in this issue
are franchising agreements, kinowhow licensing, and securities regu-
lation.2 Before examining these three fields, however, it is important
to obtain a basic understanding of the EEC.
I. LEGISLATING TH ROUGH DnmcTmvEs, DECISIONS, AND
REGULATIONS
The principal goal of the EEC is to advance the quality of life in
the Community by integrating Western European markets and uni-
1. The European Economic Community was created at the signing of the Treaty of
Rome on March 25, 1957. See Treaty Establishing a European Economic Community 2
U.N.T.S. 294-97 (French, German, Italian, and Dutch); 1-3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
100-5406 [hereinafter the Treaty of Rome].
2. See infra the text accompanying notes 13-62 (discussion of securities regulation), infra
the text accompanying notes 63-143 (section on franchising agreements), and infra the text
accompanying notes 144-200 (segment examining knowhow licensing).
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fying European economic policies.3 The Council and the Commission
are the lawmaking institutions entrusted with the responsibility of
achieving these objectives. 4 Community legislation takes place through
regulations, decisions, and directives adopted by either the Council
or the Commission.5 Regulations are paramount to national law and
bind all natural and legal persons., In contrast, decisions and direc-
tives are binding only on the parties to whom they are addressed.
7
The effect of economic legislation by the Community institutions
varies depending on whether the institutions issue regulations or
directives. When administering the competition policy of article 85,
for example, the Commission enacts regulations.8 These regulations
create a uniform legal standard throughout the Community and
supersede all conflicting national laws. 9 In the field of securities
regulation, on the other hand, the institutions use directives to
harmonize national laws.10 Because member nations are free to select
the form the directive will take, a Community directive allows some
3. Treaty of Rome, art. 2. The Treaty of Rome specifies several secondary objectives to
achieve integration. The more significant secondary targets include: (1) implementation of a
Community-wide competition regime; (2) the free movement of goods, capital, services, and
labor; (3) the harmonization of laws; and (4) the establishment of a customs union and a
common agricultural policy. Id. art. 3.
4. Article 145 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Council to ensure the coordination
of the general economic policies of the member states. Id. art. 145. See also id. arts. 145-54
(governing the composition, duties, and governance of the Council). Article 155 authorizes the
Commission to ensure enforcement of the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by
the institutions. Id. art. 155. See also id. arts. 155-63 (describing the composition, duties, and
governance of the Commission). Article 189 empowers both institutions to take decisions,
adopt regulations, and issue directives. Id. art. 189. See also id. arts. 189-92 (provisions
common to the Community institutions).
5. Id. art. 189. The various provisions of the Treaty of Rome allocate direct authority
to adopt regulations in the Council. See, e.g., id. art. 49 (vesting authority to provide for the
free movement of workers by making regulations in the Council); id. art. 89 (vesting authority
to make decisions implementing the competition policy of articles 85 and 86 in the Council).
In certain areas, however, the Council delegates this regulation-making power to the Commis-
sion. See, e.g., Council Reg. 19/65, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717-25 (Oct. 4, 1977)
(granting the Commission authority to adopt regulations governing the use of restrictive
obligations in agreements involving the distribution of goods or the acquisition of industrial
property rights).
6. Treaty of Rome, art. 189.
7. Id. But see C.W.A. Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect Within the National Legal
System, 16 CommoN Mr. L. R~a. 533, 537-44 (1979) (discussing circumstances under which
directives addressed to the member states create obligations on individuals without interference
of national law).
8. See, e.g., Council Reg. 417/85, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 53) 1 (1985), 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2753, at 1985 (Mar. 14, 1985) (prohibiting certain obligations which restrict
competition in research and development agreements).
9. Treaty of Rome, art. 189.
10. See infra the text accompanying notes 13-62 (studying the Community securities
regulation directives with special attention to the most recent directive).
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variation from state to state." In addition to the potential for
variation, member states sometimes resist or delay implementing
legislation which fully effectuates the objects pursued by the Com-
munity.'2 With this general understanding in mind, discussion turns
to the selected areas of review.
II. SEcurs REGULATION
In a relatively short period, the Community institutions have
structured disclosure laws governing listed securities which are roughly
equivalent to United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requirements. 3 This segment reviews EEC securities offerings
directives. 14 The first section concentrates on the EEC securities
directives which apply primarily to disclosure requirements for se-
curities traded on official exchanges.' 5 The second section discusses
a 1987 directive which attempts to streamline the procedure for
admission to EEC exchanges by obliging states to recognize another
state's admission requirements.'6 The final section examines the im-
11. Treaty of Rome, art. 189.
12. See P. Merloe, Internationalization of Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U.S.
and EEC Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. Comrn. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 249, 257 (discussing
compliance lags by member states in implementing securities disclosure directives) [hereinafter
Merloel. See also infra note 50 (discussing member states' resistance to a proposed securities
directive).
13. The Council adopted the first securities directive in 1979. See infra the text accom-
panying notes 27-40 (examining the provisions of the first securities directive). However, the
Council adopted other directives governing disclosure requirements applicable to company
formation as early as 1968. See, e.g., Council Directive 68/151, O.3. Eux. Comm. (No. L 65)
8 (1968), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1351, at 1151 (Aug. 2, 1983). See infra note 22
(listing Council directives related to company formation, accounting principles, auditing stan-
dards, consolidated accounts, mergers, and divisions). -See infra notes 40, 45, and 47 (explaining
the similarity of Council securities directives and SEC securities disclosure requirements).
14. The Community effort to increase the attractiveness of EEC financial markets extends
also to laws governing the purchase of securities. The Council regulates the purchase of
securities pursuant to Treaty of Rome provisions governing the liberalization of capital
movements. Council Directive 80/390, preamble, I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1731, at
1385 (Aug. 30, 1983). See also Treaty of Rome, arts. 67-73 (Treaty of Rome provisions
governing free movement of capital in the Community); Council Directive 86/566, 29 O.J.
Eua. CoMu. (No. L 332) 22 (1986) (most recent Council directive implementing Treaty of
Rome capital liberalization objectives). See generally Oliver, Free Movement of Capital Between
Member States: Article 67(1) EEC and the Implementing Directives, 9 Ev'. L. Ra,. 401 (1984)
(article describing the Council directives governing capital movements in the Community).
15. See infra the text accompanying notes 18-55 (discussion of EEC securities directives
existing prior to 1987). The Council securities directives do not define the terms "official
listing" or "stock exchange" but one commentator suggests that the phrase "official listing"
refers to the part of the securities market to which admission is most difficult and which
provides maximum investor protection). Wooiridge, Some Recent Community Legislation in
the Field of Securities Law, 10 Eva. L. REV. 3, 6 (1985).
16. See infra the text accompanying notes 56-59 (outlining changes to the securities
regulation scheme resulting from the 1987 directive).
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pact of EEC securities regulation on international offerings. 7
A. The Community Securities Regulation Scheme
The Council issues securities directives pursuant to Treaty of Rome
(Treaty) provisions which protect the freedom of Community resi-
dents to establish and conduct businesses in more than one member
state.'8 Article 54(3)(g) obligates the Community to coordinate na-
tional laws protecting the interests of investors. 19 Article 100 empow-
ers the institutions to harmonize national laws which directly affect
the establishment of the common market and its ability to function.
20
Relying on these powers, the Council has attempted to integrate
securities markets by establishing consistent disclosure laws and ex-
change admission requirements.21
Three directives anchor EEC securities regulation.2? The first of
these directives specifies conditions for admission of securities to an
17. See infra the text accompanying notes 60-62 (concluding section discussing international
implications of EEC securities directives).
18. Treaty of Rome, arts. 52-58. See generally, WYATt & DAsiwooD, Tan SuNsirvE
LAw op r EEC, 182-204 (1980) (surveying actions taken by Community institutions toward
freedom of establishment for natural persons and companies). EEC securities directives are
based on articles 54 and 100 of the Treaty of Rome. Council Directive 79/279, 22 O.J. EuR.
Coin. (No. L 66) 21 (1979), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) preamble, 1721, at 1383 (Aug.
30, 1983) [hereinafter Admissions Directive]; Council Directive 80/390, 23 O.3. EUt. CoMM.
(No. L 100) 1 (1980), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) preamble, 1731, at 1385 (Aug. 30,
1983) [hereinafter Listing Particulars Directive]; Council Directive 82/121, 25 O.J. EuR. Comm.
(No. L 48) 26 (1982), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) preamble, 1741, at 1391 (Aug. 30,
1983) [hereinafter Periodic Reporting Directive].
19. Treaty of Rome, art. 54(g). Article 54(g) provides:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon them...
in particular:
(g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection
of the interests of members and others, are required by the Member States of
companies or firms. .. with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout
the Community.]
Id.
20. Treaty of Rome, art. 100. Article 100 states in relevant part: "The Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation
of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market."
Id.
21. See, e.g., Admissions Directive, supra note 18, 1721, at 1383 ("[the coordination
of conditions for admission] will make for greater interpenetration of national securities
markets and therefore contribute to the prospect of establishing a European capital market").
See also Comm'n Press Release, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,837, at 11,957-58 (Dec.
18, 1986) (summarizing Community progress toward integration of Community securities
markets).
22. Admissions Directive, supra note 18, 1721, at 1383; Listing Particulars Directive,
supra note 18, 1731, at 1385; Periodic Reporting Directive, supra note 18, 1741, at 1391.
These securities directives are part of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme which includes
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official stock exchange (Admissions Directive).2 3 The second pre-
scribes information required from issuers seeking admission to an
official stock exchange (Listing Particulars Directive). 24 The third
directive imposes periodic reporting obligations on issuers with se-
curities listed in an official stock exchange (Reporting Directive).2 s
In addition, the Council may adopt another fundamental directive
which would establish compulsory disclosure requirements for un-
listed securities (Prospectus Directive).26
1. Admissions Directive
The purpose of the Admissions Directive is to provide uniform
safeguards for Community investors and to create consistent condi-
tions for admission to official listings.27 This directive outlines min-
imum conditions for admission to an official exchange and imposes
further obligations on the issuer for the period the securities remain
listed.28 The conditions for admissi6n include a minimum capitali-
zation of at least one million European units of account.2
For both initial and secondary distributions, the Admissions Di-
rective requires indications that there is sufficient investor demand
or public ownership of the securities to allow the market to operate
properly. 0 For initial distributions, the authorizing body must con-
clude that investors will purchase a threshold percentage of shares
within a short time.31 The numerical test'of sufficiency is twenty-five
directives governing accounting methods, company formation, consolidated accounts, mergers,
divisions, and other specialized business activities. See Merloe, supra note 12, at 256-61
(describing Council directives relating to company formation, accounting principles, auditing
standards, and proposed directive relating to information disclosure to company employees);
Council Directive 78/855, 21 O.J. EtuR. Comm. (No. L 295) 36 (1978), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1361, at 1181 (Aug. 2, 1983) (mergers); Council Directive 82/891, 25 O.J. Er.
Comn. (No. L 378) 47 (1982), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1411, at 1241 (Aug. 16, 1983)
(divisions).
23. Admissions Directive, supra note 18, art. 1(1), 1721A, at 1383-2.
24. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 18, art. l(1), 1731A, at 1385-2.
25. Periodic Reporting Directive, supra note 18, art. 2, 1741B, at 1391-2.
26. Proposed Council Prospectus Directive, 25 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 226) 4 (1982), 1
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1751, at 1393 (Aug. 30, 1983) [hereinafter Prospectus Directive].
The Prospectus Directive is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 48-50.
27. Admissions Directive, supra note 18, preamble, 1721, at 1383.
28. Id. supra note 18, art. 4, 1721D, 1383-2.
29. Id. supra note 18, sched. A(I)(2), 1722, at 1383-7.
30. Id. supra note 18, sched. A(II)(4), 1722, 1383-6. See also Financial Times (London),
Oct. 21, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 7 (attributing the failure of a 2 billion dollar offering to the
large size of the offering and the haste with which the offering was executed).
31. Id. supra note 18, sched. A(II)(4), 1722, 1383-6. Member States must designate a
competent authority to authorize admission to securities exchanges. The authorizing body in
the United Kingdom is the Council of the Stock Exchange. Woolridge, supra note 15, 7 n.21.
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percent of the subscribed capital in publicly held shares. 32 Lower
percentages are acceptable when a large number of shares of the
same class are widely distributed.
33
When an issuer makes a public offering before applying for ad-
mission, the exchange can quote the stock only after the subscription
period has ended and a wide ownership base exists. 34 The sufficiency
of a secondary offering of the same class of shares depends on the
actual or predicted distribution in relation to all the outstanding
shares of that class.3s Finally, the authorizing body may consider
shares listed outside the Community when determining if distribution
is adequate.
36
The Admissions Directive also imposes a broad range of continuing
obligations on firms admitted to an official stock exchange.37 These
obligations include informing shareholders of meetings, permitting
shareholders to exercise their voting rights, and treating shareholders
who hold the same class of shares equally.3 The directive also requires
the issuing firm to disclose annual accounts, annual reports, consol-
idated accounts, amendments to corporate instruments, and other
information relevant to informed investor decision-making. 39 These
shareholder information rights are similar to the rights held by
shareholders under American securities laws.
40
2. Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars Directive adds to the disclosure regime
established by the Admissions Directive. 41 Under this directive, mem-
ber states must condition admission to an exchange on a firm's
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. supra note 18, sched. A(II)(3), 1722, at 1383-8.
35. Id. supra note 18, sched. A(11)(4), 1722, at 1383-6.
36. Id. Similar conditions apply to debt securities. Id. sched. B, I 1722A, 1838-9, 10.




40. Compare Admissions Directive, supra note 18, art. 4, 1721D, at 1383-84 (EEC
exchange admission disclosure requirements) with SEC Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
7121, at 6211 (Jan. 14, 1987) (approximately equivalent SEC disclosure obligations); compare
Admissions Directive, supra note 18, scheds. C-D, 14 1722B-C, at 1383-10 to 1383-12 (EEC
shareholder rights to information) with SEC Forms 10-K (4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 29,701,
at 21,745) and 20-F (4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 29,701, at 21,745) (similar SEC provisions).
41. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 18, art. 1, 1371A, at 1385-2.
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publication of listing particulars.42 The information required is ex-
haustive.43 The published particulars must supply information nec-
essary to make an informed assessment of the firm's assets, liabilities,
and profits and losses&" The particulars must also include information
relating to shareholders' rights.45
3. Reporting Directive
A third directive requires firms with listed securities to draft
biannual statements for investors.4 The statements must disclose
recent financial information and discuss relevant anticipated activi-
ties.47
4. Proposed Prospectus Directive
The Council intends to expand the securities regulation regime to
encompass unlisted securities offerings.4 8 The Prospectus Directive,
if ad6pted, will require member states to condition subscription or
sale of unlisted securities on publication of a prospectus.4 9 Some
member nations, however, question the need for the Prospectus
Directive and this may delay its adoption.50
5. Summary of EEC Securities Regulation Scheme up to 1987
When combined, the three securities directives create uniform
minimum standards for admission to EEC securities exchanges and
42. Id. art. 3, 1731C, at 1385-3. The directive allows exemptions under specified
conditions. See, e.g., id. art. 9, 1371J, 1385-6 (debt securities where other securities are
already listed); id. art. 10, 1371K, at 1385-7.
43. See, e.g., id. sched. A, 1733, at 1387 to 1387-10 (requiring disclosure concerning
parties responsible for listing particulars and account auditing; the shares offered; the issuer
and its capital; the issuer's activities; the issuer's assets and liabilities, financial position, and
profits and losses; the issuer's management, administration, and supervision; and the recent
development and prospects of the issuer).
44. Id. art. 4(1), 1731D, at 1385-3.
45. Id. The requirements of the Listing Particulars Directive approximate U.S. disclosure
obligations contained in SEC forms 10-K and 20-F. Compare id. art. 4(1), 1731D, at 1385-
3 (EEC listing particulars) with SEC Forms 10-K (4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 29,701, at
21,745) and 20-F (4 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 29,701, at 21,745) (similar SEC provisions).
46. Periodic Reporting Directive, supra note 18, art. 2, 1741, at 1391-2.
47. Id. art. 5, 1741E, at 1391-3. Compare id. (EEC biannual disclosure requirement)
with SEC Forms 10-Q (4 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,031, at 22,011 (June 17, 1981)) and
8-K (4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,002, at 21,991 (July 1, 1987)) (SEC quarterly disclosure
system).
48. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 26, 1751, at 1393.
49. Id. art. 4, 1751D, at 1393-3.
50. See Wooiridge, supra note 15, at 17-18 (describing criticisms of Prospectus Directive).
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impose a system of continuous disclosure for firms with listed se-
curities. 51 The directives create shareholder's rights associated with
the ownership of securities. 52 Member states may impose more strin-
gent admission and disclosure requirements when implementing the
directives into national legislation, provided the additional burden
applies equally to all issuers.53 Further, if the Council adopts the
Prospectus Directive, the regulation scheme will extend to unlisted
securities. 54 Finally, the disclosure and shareholder's provisions of
the directives parallel SEC rules for listed securities. 55
B. The 1987 Mutual Recognition Directive
As is the case with other EEC securities directives, the Mutual
Recognition Directive is part of a larger movement to increase the
attractiveness of EEC securities markets to international investors.56
The Mutual Recognition Directive amends the Listing Particulars
Directive by requiring member'states to admit securities to exchanges
based on disclosure texts drafted in accordance with another member
nation's laws. In its original form, the Listing Particulars Directive
allowed member states to condition exchange admission on the sub-
mission of listing particulars drafted in accordance with that member
nation's laws.57 Under this provision, firms might be obliged to draft
particulars in accordance with the laws of each member state where
the firm plans to list securities. Such a duplicative obligation is
precisely the impediment the Community seeks to eliminate from the
regulation system. 8 Therefore, the Mutual Recognition Directive
allows firms issuing multinational offerings to submit listing parti-
culars drafted in accordance with the laws of one nation to all EEC
exchanges. 59
51. See supra the text accompanying notes 27-40 (describing the minimum standards for
admission).
52. See supra the text accompanying notes 37-40 (describing shareholder's rights).
53. See, e.g., Admissions Directive, supra note 18, art. 5, 17210, at 1383-2,-3.
54. See supra the text accompanying notes 48-50 (describing the Prospectus Directive).
55. See supra notes 40, 45, and 47 (discussing similarity of EEC and SEC securities
regulations).
56. See Council Directive 87/345, 30 O.J. EuR. Comms. (No. L 185) 81 (1987) amending
Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 18 [hereinafter. Mutual Recognition Directive] (stating
that obligation on states to develop a single text for listing particulars was insufficient to bring
about the mutual recognition intended by the Council).
57. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 18, art. 24, 1371Z, at 1385-12.
58. See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 18, preamble, 1371, at 1385 (citing the
elimination of difficulties obtaining admission as on the objectives of the Listing Particulars
Directive).
59. Mutual Recognition Directive, supra note 56, art. 24a, at 81-82.
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C. Implications of EEC Securities Directives for International
Offerings
In the fairly short span of ten years, the Community has instituted
a disclosure scheme equivalent to that existing in the United States
with regard to securities traded on official exchanges. One funda-
mental principle of the disclosure scheme is to provide continuous
financial reports and other relevant information to investors. As well,
this scheme includes meaningful shareholder participation in the
control of the firm. The similarity of EEC disclosure statements to
SEC requirements evidences the evolution of an international stan-:
dard based on the purposes and principles underlying the disclosure
provisions.60
The Mutual Recognition Directive moves recognition of nonmem-
ber nations' listing particulars closer to realization. As it currently
stands, mutual recognition in the EEC serves only firms established
in the Community.61 The Council, however, intends to negotiate
reciprocal recognition agreements with nonmember nations. 62 Con-
sequently, international issuers may soon obtain admission to all EEC
stock exchanges by filing a single disclosure statement.
III. FRANCmSING AGREEMENTS
In the last decade, franchising agreements have become consider-
ably more popular in the EEC as numerous undertakings rely on
frahchising to expand guccessful distribution networks.6 The increas-
60. See supra notes 40, 45, and 47 (discussing similarity of EEC disclosure requirements
implemented in the securities directives with SEC disclosure forms).
61. Mutual Recognition Directive, supra note 56, art. 24a(5), at 82. Article 24a(5) provides
that: "Member States may restrict applicatiop of [mutual recognition to firms] having their
registered office in a Member State." Id.
62. Mutual Recognition Directive, supra note 56, art. 25a, at 83. Article 25a states, in
relevant part, that: "It]he Community may, by means of agreements with non-member countries
... recognize listing particulars drawn up and checked, in accordance with the rules of the
non-member country or countries, as meeting the requirements of this directive, subject to.
reciprocity ... ." Id.
In recent international negotiations with Canada and the United Kingdom, the SEC proposed
two possible alternatives to facilitate listing securities on the exchanges of several nations. The
alternatives are mutual recognition and development of a common prospectus. Merloe, supra
note 12, at 264-65.
63. A 1987 Commission Press Release estimates that there are 1500 franchise networks in
the Community comprised of 85,000 franchise outlets. Comm'n Press Release, 3 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,894, at 12,148-49 (July 16, 1987). Franchise systems or networks consist
essentially of licenses of intellectual property rights and/or commercial knowhow and expertise
to be exploited in selling goods or providing services. The franchise outlets usually share a
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ing popularity of franchising agreements, however, caused practition-
ers to worry because of the uncertain legal status of franchising
agreements under Community antitrust laws. 64 This uncertainty arises
because the agreements involve restrictions on commercial freedoms
traditionally subject to antitrust scrutiny.6 In establishing a coordi-
nated marketing network, the franchisor maintains some control over
the franchisee's business operations, grants the franchisee territorial
exclusivity, and suggests retail prices. 66
A definitive Community position with regard to exploitation of
these restrictive obligations in franchising agreements is necessary to
ensure the validity of the agreements. 67 The controlling Treaty pro-
vision is article 85 which governs agreements or practices which
restrict competition.6 8 Pursuant to article 85, illegal agreements are
unenforceable in national courts and punishable by fine.69 In a burst
common appearance. The popularity of the franchise mechanism with successful distributors
lies in the opportunity it affords to rapidly penetrate markets without the need for major
investments. Id. Franchisees bear the initial investment costs and, consequently, the risk of
failure. This independence fosters entrepreneurial qualities, contributing to the efficiency of
the system. See Comm'n Decision, Computerland, 30 O.J. ErR. Comw. (No. L 222) 12 (1987),
3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906, at 12,165 (Aug. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Computerland].
64. See, e.g., Goebel, The Uneasy Fate of Franchising Under EEC Antitrust Laws, 10
Eur.r L. Ray. 87 (1985) [hereinafter Goebel].
65. Article 85 is one of the Community's principal antitrust statutes. Treaty of Rome,
art. 85. Parties violating article 85 are subject to fines (Council Reg. 17/62, art. 15, 5 J.0.
Com. EuR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401, at 1713 (April 11,
1985)), which may be substantial when the rule broken is of general notoriety and significant
importance. See Goebel, supra note 64, at 96-104 (summarizing fines imposed by the Com-
mission for parallel import restrictions, cross-supply bans, and resale price influencing). The
other Community statute is article 86, which prescribes abuse of a dominant position. See
Treaty of Rome, art. 86.
66. See, e.g., Comm'n Decision, Pronuptia, 30 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L 13) 39 (1987),
4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,854, at 12,037 (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Pronuptia 2]
(including provisions, among others, whereby the franchisee agrees to carry on the business in
the particular manner developed by the franchisor and to refrain from competing with other
outlets); Comm'n Decision, Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EuR. Cons. (No. L 8) 49, 4 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,047 (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Yves Rocher] (including provisions,
among others, whereby the franchisor agrees not to permit other outlets within a franchisee's
contract territory and to circulate recommended resale prices). See also Goebel, supra note 64,
at 88-89 (listing other provisions common to franchising agreements).
67. See Treaty of Rome, art. 85(2) (invalidating agreements that impermissibly restrict
competition).
68. Treaty of Rome, art. 85. See infra the text accompanying notes 73-76 (describing the
provisions of article 85).
69. Treaty of Rome, art. 85(2). Council Reg. 17/65, art. 15, 5 J.0. EuR. Com. (No.
13) 204 (1962), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401, at 1713 (April 11, 1985) (authorizing
the Commission to impose fines on parties entering agreements in violation of article 85).
Regulation 17/65 allows parties to an agreement which may violate article 85 to notify the
Commission of the agreement and obtain approval for the restrictions. Council Reg. 17/65,
art. 2, 2411, at 1715. Notification can foreclose the imposition of fines for illegal agreements
(id. art. 15(5)(a), 2541, at 1771) but may involve complications if the Commission uses the
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of activity in the past year, the Commission rendered three decisions7°
approving standard form franchising agreements.21 Subsequently, the
Commission adopted a draft regulation exempting franchising agree-
ments from article 85 antitrust scrutiny (franchising regulation). 2
The following sections examine the commercial restraints author-
ized in the franchising regulation. The study includes reference to
the Commission's franchising decisions, which elucidate practical
aspects of the general principles contained in the regulation. The
concluding section discusses the prospective ramifications of the
franchising regulation and decisions.
A. General Application of Article 85 to Franchising Agreements
The'Commission's position regarding the use of franchising agree-
ments builds on the articulation of Community competition policy
contained in article 85 of the Treaty of Rme.7s Article 85(1) prohibits
agreements which distort, restrict, or prevent competition. 74 These
agreements are void unless they qualify for exemption under article
85(3) by improving production or distribution, promoting technical
or economic progress, and transfering the benefits of progress to
consumers.75 Consequently, while agreements within the scope of
notified agreement as policy precedent. See Goebel, supra note 64, at 90-92 (discussing the
pros and cons of notifying agreements). In Pronuptia de Paris v. Irngard Schillgalis (4
CommonMkt. Rep. (CCH) (1987) 14,245, at 16,434 (1986)), the first case in which the
Court of Justice adjudicated the application of article 85 to franchising agreements, the
defendant attempted to avoid payment of royalties by having the contract declared invalid
under article 85. Id. 14,245, at 16,436.
70. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,165; Yves Roher, supra note 66,
10,855, at 12,047; Pronuptia 2, supra note 66, 10,854, at 12,037.
71. Standard form franchising agreements are the contracts a franchisor proposes to sign
with all its franchisees. See Pronuptia 2, supra note 66, 10,854, at 12,042.
72. Commission Draft Regulation Governing the Use of Franchising Agreements in the
EEC, 30 O.1. EutR. Comm. (No. C 229) 3 (1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,916, at
12,212 [hereinafter Franchising Regulation]. If adopted, the draft regulation will become
effective on January 1, 1989. Franchising Regulation, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) art. 9,
10,916, at 12,218. The period for public comment ended November 1, 1987. Id. 10,916, at
12,212.
73. The Commission's authority to administer the policy of article 85 by issuing individual
decisions derives from article 89 of the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty of Rome, art. 89.
74. Treaty of Rome, art. 85(1). In relevant part, article 85(1) prohibits: "agreements
between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market
.." d.
75. Treaty of Rome, art. 85(2); Id. art. 85(3). § 2 of article 85 declares any agreement
violating § 1 void. Id. art. 85(2). Article 85(3) exempts any agreement which:
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
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article 85(1) are not automatically void, they must satisfy the require-
ments of article 85(3) in order to be valid. 76
By enacting a regulation exempting a specific category of agreement
from article 85(1), the Commission guarantees the legality of that
type of agreement. 7 These regulations commonly specify classes of
obligations which are permissible and declare certain restrictions
unenforceable. 8 A regulation declaring the compatibility of restrictive
obligations with the policy of article 85 does not, however, completely
preclude the use of restrictions which exceed the parameters defined
in the regulation.79 When the parties to an agreement, because of the
peculiar nature of their relationship or the relevant market, believe
additional restrictions are necessary, they may apply for Commission
approval of the additional obligations.80 Thus, although the limita-
tions prescribed in the regulation provide general guidelines, the
Community maintains a receptive attitude toward innovative agree-
ments.
B. Permissible Restraints on the Commercial Freedom of
Members of a Franchising Network
The Community position with regard to franchising agreements
attempts to strike a balance between fostering the effective use of
franchising networks and maintaining restraints on commercial free-
doms within reasonable limits"' The Commission perceives the fran-
chise mechanism as a legitimate means of earning profits by applying
the business expertise and product reputation developed by the fran-
chisor.82 More importantly, the Commission favors the franchise
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of
a substantial part of the products in question.
Id.
76. Treaty of Rome, art. 85(3).
77. Commission authority to issue regulations is discussed supra at note 5 and the
accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, arts. 2-5, 10,916, at 12,215-17.
Articles 2 and 3 describe permissible restrictions on competition while articles 4 and 5 indicate
which obligations preclude exemption.
79. See, e.g., Id. supra note 72, art. 6, 10,916, at 12,215.
80. Id.
81. See Comm'n Press Release, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,894, at 12,148-49
(July 16, 1987). Article 85 on its face seems dedicated to monitoring the attempts of private
entities to ensure that this balance is assured. See supra notes 73-76 (outlining the provisions
of article 85).
82. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,165.
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mechanism as a means of expansion because of its ability to rapidly
penetrate markets, rationalize distribution, and benefit consumers. 
3
These favorable consequences make the Commission more likely to
approve franchising agreements because they mirror the policy con-
cerns of article 85(3). 84
In its decisions and draft regulation, the Commission directs the
most extensive attention to the following five- classes of obligations:
(1) obligations connected to the basic service of the franchise; 5 (2)
terms intended to protect the franchisor's knowhow and expertise
from benefiting competitors; 6 (3) clauses directed to preserving the
integrity of the network image and product reputation;7 (4) provisions
creating a contract territory;8 and (5) terms influencing a franchisee's
pricing policy.s9
1. Obligations Connected to the Basic Services of the Franchise
The basic service of the franchise is the transfer of a package of
intelectual, industrial, and other intangible rights in exchange for
consideration, usually royalties.* The franchisor transfers these rights
in the form of trademarks, tradenames, shok signs, utility models,
designs, patents, copyrights, and/or commercial knowhow. 91 The
Commission considers obligations on the part of the franchisor to
provide a business formillaP2 the basic service of the franchise.9 In
return for the right to exploit the franchisor's successful business
83. Id. at 12,166. The Computerland system provides an example of the rationalization
envisioned by the Commission. Computerland acts as a centralized purchasing agent. It takes
orders from the franchisees, purchases the goods, then resells them to the franchisees. Through
this system, Computerland procures more favorable prices for its franchisees by purchasing in
bulk and, at the same time, increases the speed with which goods move from suppliers to
retail outlets. Consumers benefit from this rationalization in the form of reduced prices. Id.
at 12,175.
84. See Comm'n Press Release, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,894, at 12,148-49
(July 16, 1987) (explaining the Commission's favorable view on franchising).
85. See infra § B(I) (sectiofi discussing obligations connected to the basic services of the
franchise).
86. See infra § B(2) (section discussing clauses intended to protect the franchisor's
knowhow from benefiting competitors).
87. See infra § B(2) (discussing the protection of a franchisor's image and reputation).
88. See infra § B(3) (examining the use of territorial restrictions in franchising agreements).
89. See infra § B(4) (text discussing terms related to pricing policy).
90. Pronuptia de Paris v. Iingard Schilligalis, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at
16,438 (May 22, 1986).
91. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, art. 1(2)(b), 10,916, at 12,215.
92. The business formula consists of initial and continuing assistance in selecting and
outfitting the premises, advertising, training, and other information or practices which promote
the competitive advantage of the franchisee. Ad.
93. Id.
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formula, the franchisor may receive royalties based on a percentage
of the franchisee's sales.94
In the Commission's view, these obligations are not restraints
within the meaning of article 85(1). 95 The Commission's position
draws from a 1986 decision of the European Court of Justice (Court)
in Pronuptia v. Schillgalis.96 In Pronuptia, the Court evaluated the
legal status of franchising agreements under article 85(1). 97 The Court
concluded that the basic franchise relationship, the transfer of a
franchise package in exchange for royalties, does not in itself interfere
with competition.98 Rather, the agreements are a legitimate method
for an undertaking to earn profits from its expertise without investing
its own capital.99 Consequently, obligations which require the fran-
chisor to supply the business formula, and reciprocal obligations
which require the franchisee to pay royalties, do not restrain com-
petition within the context of article 85(1). 100
2. Restrictions Intended to Protect the Franchisor's Knowhow
and to Preserve the Reputation of the Franchise
The Commission directs higher scrutiny on a franchisor's attempts
to prevent disclosure of the business formula to competitors and to
protect the identity and reputation of the network. 0' In Pronuptia,
the Court held that provisions reducing the risk of disclosure are not
restrictions within the meaning of article 85 (l). 102 However, the
franchising regulation and Commission decisions clearly establish that
the franchisor can protect the commercial knowhow and other intan-
gible rights transfered to the franchisee only if the restraints are
reasonable and motivated by an acceptable purpose.
94. See id. art. l(2)(a).
95. See Pronuptia 2, supra note 90, § 10,854, at 12,042.
96. Pronuptia, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,435-42.
97. Id. at 16,435-40. The Court held that (1) the compatibility of franchise agreements
for the distribution of goods with article 85(1) depends on the provisions of the agreement,
provisions taken individually and in their economic context; (2) provisions strictly necessary
to prevent competitors from benefiting from the franchisor's knowhow and expertise and to
preserve the identity and reputation of the franchise are not restrictions subject to article 85(1);
(3) provisions resulting in the sharing of markets constitute restrictions within the meaning of
article 85(1); (4) price recommendations by the franchisor do not, without more, come within
article 85(l); and (5) that franchise agreements which involve market sharing affect trade
between Member States. Id. at 16,44142.
98. Id. at 16,438.
99. Id.
100. See Pronuptia 2, supra note 66, 10,854, at 12,042.
101. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,214.
102. Pronuptia, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,441.
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Common protection obligations include post-term noncompetition
clauses and use restrictions."1 3 The Commission subjects noncompe-
tition clauses to several limitations. Post-term noncompetition obli-
gations mist be reasonable in duration and geographical extent.' 04
For example, in Yves Rocher,1 5 the Commission approved the fran-
chisee's promise to refrain from carrying on a competing business in
the contract territory for one year after termination of the agree-
ment.'06 Upon termination of the agreement, the Commission stated
that the franchisor was entitled to a reasonable time in which to
reestablish a competitive presence in the area without competition
from the franchisee.107
Post-term use bans imposed on the franchisee are permissible in
order to protect the franchisor's knowhow from benefiting compet-
itors."'3 However, a franchisee may protect business methods which
are separable from those imparted as part of the franchise. 1°9 The
Commission considers independently developed methods separable
from the franchise package and eligible for immediate use by the
franchisee upon- termination of the franchise agreement. 10 Thus, a
provision preventing a franchisee from challenging the validity of the
franchisor's intellectual property rights is illegal because the franchi-
sor may use this provision to prevent a franchisee from using
independently developed knoWhow.1"'
The Commission allows franchisees wide leeway to control the
identity and reputation of the network. The franchisor can prohibit
assignment of the franchise without its consent"2 and prevent the
franchisee from carrying on its business in unsuitable premises."
3
The franchisor may require the franchisee to use the knowhow to
103. See, e.g., Yves Rocher, supa note 66, 10,855, at 12,051 (obligation not to compete
with Yves Rocher in the contract territory for a period of one year after termination of the
agreement); id. at 12,050 (clause permitting franchisee to employ franchised rights only in
connection with the operation of the franchise).
104. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,171; Pronuptia 2, supra note 66,
10,854, at 12,042; Yves Rocher, supra note 66, 10,855, at 12,054.
105. 30 O.J. Eur. Com?&. (No. L 8) 49 (1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at
12,037 (Feb. 26, 1987).
106. Yves Rocher, supra note 66, 10,855, at 12,054.
107. rd. This provision, however, does not stop the franchisee from establishing a competing
business outside the contract territory. Id.
108. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,216.
109. See Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,167-68.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, art. 2(a), 10,916, at 12,215; id. art. 3(1)(n),
10,916, at 12,216.
113. Id. art. 2(b), 10,916, at 12,215; id. art. 3(1)(m), 10,916, at 12,216.
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select the premises and to carry out the business. 114 With regard to
promotion, the agreement can require the franchisee to obtain the
franchisor's approval of local advertising." s A franchisor may deter-
mine the source and nature of the goods sold at the outlet." 6 The
franchisor may also limit the franchise6's clientele."
7
Using these types of obligations, franchisors can create divergent
distribution networks. Compare, for instance, the networks main-
tained by Computerland and Yves Rocher in the EEC." 8 Computer-
land operates a network offering microcomputer products and
addresses its marketing format to business users. 19 The franchisees
may sell products from any supplier, as long as Computerland
approves them.' ° The marketing strategy of Yves Rocher, on the
other hand, stresses the unique natural compositon of Yves Rocher
beauty products.' 2' As a consequence, the franchisee may not sell to
resellers outside of the network nor distribute goods of other prod-
ucers. n2 Yves Rocher also maintains stringent controls over the
franchisee's trading methods, outlet layout, sales techniques, and
promotion.1 3 The two networks differ in that the Computerland
franchisees are given a much higher degree of commercial freedom.
In a field such as beauty products, however, where an image of
exclusivity plays a significant role in the network's success, the
franchisor can control virtually every detail of the operation of
franchise outlets.
3. Clauses Establishing Contract Territories
The Commission acknowledges that guarantees of territorial pro-
tection constitute restrictions of competition within the meaning of
article 85(l). 124 The franchising regulation grants an exemption for
114. Id. art. 3(1)0), (k), 10,916, at 12,216.
115. Id. art. 3(1)(i), 10,916, at 12,216.
116. Id. art. 3(1)(a), (b), 10,916, at 12,216.
117. Id. art. 2(c), 10,916, at 12,215-16. The franchisor may not exclude from the class
of buyers.other franchisees or third parties who may obtain the same goods from other sources
for resale. Id.
118. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,165; Yves Rocher, supra note 66,
10,855, at 12,047.
119. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,166-67.
120. Id. at 12,168-69.
121. Yves Rocher distributes only through franchised outlets and by mail order. Yves
Rocher, supra note 66, 10,855, at 12,049. The Yves Rocher product theme is natural beauty
from plants. Id. at 12,052.
122. Id. at 12,051.
123. Id.
124. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,214.
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these guarantees.'2 1 The Commission, however, does limit the manner
in which a franchisor can structure territorial exclusivity.
Territorial protection is necessary to persuade franchisees to un-
dertake the initial investment and shoulder the risks of the enter-
prise.' 26 In conjunction with this purpose, the franchisor may agree
not to permit the establishment of competing outlets within the
franchisee's contract territory. 2 7 In return, the franchisor may impose
an obligation not to establish competing outlets in other franchisee's
contract territories.'17 However, restrictions should relate to location
of competing outlets and not to the franchisee's ability to sell to
consumers from other outlet's territories.
129
Territorial guarantees, because they require exemption pursuant to
article 85(3), may not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating
competition. 30 Accordingly, the franchising agreement may not pro-
hibit sales between the franchisees. 131 The territorial protection.in-
stalled by the Computerland standard agreement conform to the
requirements of the Commission franchise regulation. The agreement
provides the franchisee a prbtected area of one kilometer where the
franchisor will not permit the' establishment of competing Compu-
terland outlets. 32 The franchisee agrees to operate exclusively from
the premises approved by the franchisor. 3  The protection obligation,
however, is not one of clientele exclusivity."34 The franchisee may sell
to clients regardless of the customers' residence or place of business. 35
4. Obligations Related to Pricing Policy
The Commission approved communications between the franchisee
and the franchisor regarding pricing policy, subject to the condition
that the franchisor does not exert any pressure to adopt the circulated
prices. 36 The Commission also prohibits using injury to a product's
125. See, e.g., id. art. 2(a), 10,916, at 12,215.
126. Pronuptia 2, supra note 66, 10,854, at 12,038.
127. Franchising Regulation, art. 2(a), supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,215.
128. Id. art. 3(1)(c), 10,916, at 12,215.
129. See Yves Rocher, supra note 66, 10,855, at 12,056.
130. Treaty of Rome, art. 85(3)(b).
131. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, art. 2(c), 10,916, at 12,215.
132. Computerland, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,168.
133. Id. at 12,168. The franchisor may, however, make sales outside the premises and set
up satellite selling facilities within the contracf territory. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, art. 5(d), 10,916, at 12,217; Computer-
land, supra note 63, 10,906, at 12,172.
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reputation as a means of maintaining higher prices. 137 This proscrip-
tion eliminates the Commission's concern that a franchisor will
manipulate markets by controlling the prices of goods or services
provided through the franchise distribution network.'38
D. Implications of the Franchising Regulation for Community
Competition Policy
The application of the franchising regulation is limited in two
respects. First, with regard to manufacturing franchises, the regula-
tion only applies if the agreement does not involve the transfer of a
manufacturing license. 3 9 In some cases, manufacturing franchises
that fall outside the scope of the franchising regulation can still
qualify for an exemption pursuant to the Commission regulations
governing knowhow and patent licensing.""' Second, the agreement
cannot come within the purview of Commission regulations governing
other distribution systems.14' The distinction turns primarily on whether
the agreement conveys the right to exploit a substantial intangible
property package. 4 Another distinguishing feature of franchising
agreements is the subordination of supply and purchase obligations
to the establishment of a network of uniformly managed outlets.
43
137. Pronuptia 2, supra note 66, 10,854, at 12,041.
138. See Treaty of Rome, art. 85(1)(a) (specifying that agreements or practices which
directly or indirectly fix prices are prohibited); id. art. 85(3)(b) (precluding exemption from
article 85(1) prohibition for restrictive terms which allow parties to eliminate competition).
139. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,213.
140. Id. The knowhow and patent licensing regulations are discussed in § IV of this article.
141. Exclusive distribution agreements are the subject of separate Commission regulations
granting block exemptions from article 85 scrutiny. See Comm'n Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J.
Eur. Comm. (No. L 173) 2 (1983), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1891 (Nov. 7,
1985) (corrigenda at 26 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L 281) 24 (1983)) (exclusive distribution
regulation); Comm'n Regulation 1984/83, 26 O.J. Etm. Comm. (No. L 173) 5 (1983), 2
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1905 (Dec. 19, 1985) (corrigenda at 26 O.J. EUr.
Comm. (No. L 281) 24-25 (1983)) (exclusive purchasing regulation). See also Comm'n Notice,
26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 355) 7 (1983), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,548, amended
by 27 O.J. EurR. Comm. (No. C 101) 2 (1984), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,583 (a
comprehensive Commission notice aimed at facilitating the understanding of the exclusive
distribution and purchasing regulations); Pronuptia, supra note 90, 14,245, at 16,447-51
(opinion of the Advocate General of the European Communities discussing the similarities and
differences between franchise agreements and other distribution systems considered in judgments
of the Court of Justice); Sarad, F.EC Regulation of Fxclusive Dealing Arrangements, 3 INT'L
TAx. & Bus. LAw. 81 (summarizing the developments leading to the exclusive distribution and
purchasing regulations and analyzing the impact of the regulations). See also Lang, Selective
Distribution, 8 FoRrnaT INrT'L L.J. 323 (discussing the compatibility of various provisions of
selective distribution agreements with article 85).
142. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,213.
143. Pronuptia, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CC) at 16,454.
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The Commission policy towards franchising agreements permits
substantial freedom to develop a brand image and network reputa-
tion. This approach attributes value to the elements of the franchise
package and allows the franchisor to freely transfer the package in
exchange for royalties. However, the Commission prevents franchi-
sors from exercising excessive control over the customers served, the
sources of supply exploited, and the prices charged by the franchisee.
By controlling the use of these terms, the Commission attempts to
preserve both interbrand and intrabrand competition.
IV. KNowHow TRANsFER AND LICBNSING
A fundamental objective of the European Economic Community
is to promote the rapid development and diffusion of new technol-
ogies. 144 In an ongoing program, the Commission is developing a
technological information exchange network designed to foster in-
creased technological innovation in the EEC. 145 Technological enter-
prises, however, are often unwilling to transfer proprietary information
without adequate assurances against disclosure and competitive ap-
plication of the knowhow.'" The Community is concerned that if it
precludes these firms from controlling the exploitation of transfered
knowhow, then the firms will attempt to realize the value of the
knowhow themselves. 47 Consequently, the Commission allows enter-
prises wide latitude to control the exploitation of technical knowhow,
but attempts to encourage the development and exploitation of
innovations.1 41
144. See Treaty of Rome, art. 85(3) (permitting exemptions from Community restrictive
practices laws for agreements which promote technical or economic progress); Draft Commis-
sion Regulation on Knowhow Licensing Agreements, 30 O.J. Etm. Comm. (No. C 214) 12
(1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,911, at 12,193 (Aug. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Knowhow
Regulation] (citing technology transfer as promoting technical progress by increasing the number
of production facilities, improving the quality of goods, and expanding the possibilities of
further technical development).
145. See Comm'n Information Memo, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,831, 11,946-47
(Nov. 6, 1986) (announcing Commission approval of a proposal for a program for innovation
and technology transfer which extends a presently existing transnational innovation program).
146. See Comment, The European Commission's Approach to Knowhow Licensing: A
Critical Commentary, 33 h'L & Comp. L. Q. 181,. 189-92 (1984) (discussing the need to
permit innovators to protect and control the disseminaton of their innovations).
147. See id. See also Comm'n Regulation 2349/84 on Patent Licensing Agreements, 27
O.J. Eum. Com. (No. L 219) 15 (1984), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747, at 1951 (May
23, 1985) [hereinafter Patent Licensing Regulation] (discussing'the necessity of certain obliga-
tions to induce patentees to grant licenses).
148. See infra the text accompanying notes 196-200 (summarizing the Commission's position
with regard to obligations imposed in connection with technology transfers).
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The Treaty of Rome reserves the right to legislate in the area of
intellectual and industrial property rights to the national legislatures
of member states. 149 Community policy, however, governs the res-
trictions a holder of these rights may impose on third parties acting
in EEC markets. 150 Soon after the Treaty of Rome was signed, the
Council authorized the Commission to regulate agreements that trans-
fer industrial property rights.'5' Pursuant to this authority, the Com-
mission reviewed several restrictive obligations arising from knowhow
transfers. The Commission's activity, however, failed to address the
use of restrictive obligations within the context of a knowhow li-
censing agreement. In 1987, the Commission issued a draft regulation
directly which controls obligations connected to knowhow licensing
(Knowhow Regulation). 52 The Knowhow Regulation represents the
latest step in formulating Community standards for the concerted
exploitation of technical knowhow.
This segment of the article examines the application of Community
restrictive practices laws to knowhow transfer and licensing.'53 The
first section discusses the early Commission regulation of knowhow
transfer in sale and purchase agreements, subcontracting agreements,
mixed knowhow-patent licenses, and joint research ventures.'54 The
149. See Treaty of Rome, art. 36 (allowing the states to impose restraints on imports and
exports justified on the grounds of protection of industrial and commercial property); id. art.
222 (stating that the Treaty of Rome shall not prejudice the rules of Member States governing
property ownership). But see Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission,
[1961-66 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046, at 7618 (1966) (Aug 15, 1967)
(holding that the Community competition system does not permit using rights flowing from
trademark law to restrict competition).
150. See Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission, supra note 149,
8046; at 7618 (1966) (holding the Community competition system does not permit using rights
flowing from trademark law to restrict competition). Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome governs
restrictive practices, prohibiting practices which distort competition unless the practice promotes
economic, technical, and social progress. Treaty of Rome, art. 85. See supra the text accom-
panying notes 73-76 (discussing article 85 restrictive practices prohibitions). See also id. art.
86 (Treaty antitrust provision governing the abuse of dominant positions).
151. Council Reg. 19/65, art. 1(b), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2718, at 1872 (Oct. 4,
1977).
152. Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,191. If adopted, the Knowhow
Regulation will become effective on July, 1, 1988. Id. art. 13, 10,911, at 12,202. The period
for public comment ended November 1, 1987. Id. at 12,191.
153. This article focuses on technical, as opposed to commercial, knowhow. The Commis-
sion regulation applies generally to nonpatented technical information. Id. Commercial know-
how transfered as part of a franchise package is the subject of a 1987 draft Commission
regulation. The state of Community law with regard to franchising agreements is reviewed
supra in the text accompanying notes 63-143.
154. See infra the text accompanying notes 157-180 (discussion of knowhow transfers within
these types of agreements). A mixed license transfers rights to exploit a patent as well as
knowhow. Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,192.
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second part draws attention to the Commission's proposed regulation
governing "pure" knowhow licenses. 15 The final section summarizes
the Commission's policy with regard to technology transfer.
156
A. The Development of Community Policy Tbwards Knowhow
Transfer
The Commission regulates knowhow transfer pursuant to the article
85 provisions governing restraints on competition. Agreements within
the scope of article 85 are unenforceable unless they contribite to
social and economic progress. 157 When ruling on the legality of
restrictive agreeiients under article 85, the Commission evaluates the
terms of the agreement individually.158 Generally, the Commission
declares terms related to the protection of the value of industrial
property, such as obligations ndt to disclose the knowhow or to
grant sublicenses to third parties, outside of the scope of article 85.159
Territorial and fild-of-applikation restrictions, on the other hand,
infringe on article 85 and the Commission controls these terms to
facilitate technological develokment.160
1. Sale and Purchase Agreements
.In Reuter/BASF,'6' the Commission reviewed restrictions on the
exploitation of knowho v imposed in connection with the sale of a
business. 62 The vendor chal!tnged provisions of the purchase agree-
ment which prevented him from competing with the purchaser and
conducting noncommercial research and development. 6  The Com-
mission declared the noncompetition obligation invalid beyond the
period necessary for the purchaser to realize the full economic value
155. The Knowhow Regulation is examined infra in the text accompanying notes 181-95.
A pure knowhow license is a license granted for the exploitation of nonpatented technical
information. Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,191.
156. See infra the text accompanying notes 196-200 (concluding section).
157. See supra notes 73-76 (discussing the provisions of article 85).
158. See, e.g., Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,198 (listing individual
obligations permitted under the regulation).
159. See id. at 12,198. See also Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,215-
16 (similar proscriptions under the franchising regulation).
160. See infra the text accompanying notes 194-95 (discussing the legal status of these
obligations).
161. Comm'n Decision, Reuter/BASF, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 9862, at 9899 (Nov. 2, 1976) [hereinafter Reuter].
162. Id.
163. Id. at 9899-6.
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of the knowhow.' 64 The Commission held that five years was a
reasonable realization period, given the rapid advance of technology
in the field.' 65 In addition, the Commission invalidated the restriction
prohibiting the vendor from further research and development and
declared that a purchaser could not prevent a vendor from improving
the technical process.es The purchasing party must, therefore, prepare
to compete against innovations as well as the transfered technology
on expiration of the agreement.
2. Subcontracting Agreements
Later, the Commission approved absolute bans on subcontractors'
future use of knowhow.' 67 The Commission's position is particularly
oppressive with regard to improvements since the contractor may
prohibit the subcontractor from exploiting its own innovations. 68
This position is probably based on the fact that the contractor receives
no royalties for the transfer. 169 A subcontractor, unlike the business
vendor in Reuter, does not originally possess the ability to develop
innovations from the knowhow, nor does a subcontractor purchase
this right. 170 This interpretation suggests that the lending of knowhow
for a specific purpose, such as in a subcontracting agreement, is not
sufficient to give the transferee the right to compete with innovations.
3. Patent Licensing Agreements
In a regulation adopted in 1984, the Commission approved the use
of territorial and field-of-application obligations in patent licensing
agreements.' 7 ' The parties may share markets through geographic
divisions but not by classes of customers. 72 The parties to a licensing
agreement must also avoid customer-based market sharing when
164. Id. at 9899-10,-I.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 9899-11.
167. Comm'n Notice on Subcontracting Agreements, 22 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 1) 12
(1979), [1978-81 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,103, at 10,359 [hereinafter
Subcontracting Notice]. A subcontracting agreement is defined by the Commission as an
agreement where one firm supplies goods, work, or services for another firm in accordance
with the latter's specifications. Subcontracting Notice, id. at 10,359.
168. Id.
169. See Comment, supra note 146, at 187.
170. See supra the text accompanying notes 161-66 (discussion of freedom of seller of
business to compete by means of innovations to technology transfered as part of sale).
171. Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 147, 2747, at 1951..
172. Id. at 1956-58.
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formulating field-of-application restrictions.' 3 Nevertheless, a licensee
may gain five years of lead time through noncompetition covenants. 174
Further, the licensee can maintain increased control the knowhow's
development by reserving fields of application for independent ex-
ploitation. 75
4. Research and Development Agreements
Joint ventures and research and development (R & D) cooperation
agreements also implicate technology transfer issues. In a 1985 reg-
ulation, the Commission addressed complications arising when the
parties to the knowhow transfer occupy large market shares.176 The
regulation does not prohibit firms with large market shares from
collaborating in research and development. 77 However, when the
firms' market share exceeds twenty percent, the parties must terminate
all restrictive obligations. 78 The parties, therefore, must be in a
position to compete with each other once their combined market
share exceeds twenty percent.
Here, the Commission's analysis of whether a term is restrictive
within the meaning of article 85 becomes critical. Not all obligations
connected to knowhow transfer agreements are within the scope of
article 85. If the Commission follows its position with regard to
franchising agreements, contractual obligations preserving the value
of the knowhow fail outside the scope of article 85.179 Consequently,
dominant competitors may transfer knowhow through agreements
which create nondisclosure and, possibly, field-of-application restric-
tions. 180
B. The 1987 Knowhow Licensing Regulation
The Commission promulgated the 1987 draft knowhow regulation
(knowhow regulation) to prevent adverse effects from the large
173. Id. at 1957-58.
174. Id. at 1956-57.
175. Id.
176. Comm'n Research and Development Regulation, 28 O.J. EurR. Comm. (No. L 53) 5
(1985), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CC-) 2753, at 1985 (Mar. 14, 1985).
177. See id. art. 6, 2753F, at 1987-5.
178. See id.
179. Franchising Regulation, supra note 72, 10,916, at 12,214.
180. Secrecy is intimately tied to the value of the knowhow. Knowhow Regulation, supra
note 144, 10,911, at 12,192. Therefore, nondisclosure obligations preserve the value of the
knowhow. The subsequent draft Knowhow Regulation suggests that field-of-application res-
trictions fall outside article 85, by stating that field-of-application restrictions are not restrictive
of competition. Id. at 12,196.
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number of knowhow licensing agreements between Community
firms.' 81 Certain terms in these agreements tend to inhibit economic
progress by impeding technological development. 8 2 Other obligations
influence competition in Community markets.' The following par-
agraphs explore the Commission's position with respect to these
terms from the differing perspectives of the licensor and the licensee.
1. Obligations Protecting the Licensor's Interest
Prior to the technology transfer, the licensor possesses a natural
monopoly over the exploitation of the technology.8 As long as the
knowhow remains undisclosed, another firm will be willing to pay
royalties to exploit the technology. Even after disclosure to the public,
the knowhow continues to possess value. 1'85 This value lies in the
technological lead time associated with the knowhow-the period
required for competitors to imitate the technology through reverse
engineering. 86 Up until this reverse engineering period ends, there-
fore, the knowhow possesses value which can be realized by the
licensor. Throughout this period, the licensor may collect royalties
for the licensee's use of the knowhow.'8
The knowhow regulation also recognizes the licensor's right to
trarnsfer knowhow for a limited purpose."" This permits the licensor
to limit exploitation of the licensed knowhow to certain products
and services. 89 For each new field of application exploited by the
licensee, the licensor may collect additional royalties.
2. Obligations Promoting the Licensee's Interest
The regulation grants a licensee wide freedom to exploit innovations
to the licensed technology. A licensor cannot prohibit the licensee
181. Comm'n Press Release, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,886, at 12,135-36 (June
18, 1987).
182. See, e.g., Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,195 (describing
obligation on licensee to transfer title to improvements as inhibiting licensee's incentive to
develop innovations).
183. See, e.g., id. at 12,193 (discussing noncompetition obligations within the context of
knowhow licenses).
184. See Comment, supra note 146, at 189.
185. Knowhow Regulation, supra note 144, 10,911, at 12,195 (permitting payment of
royalties to extend after public disclosure of knowhow).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 12,196.
189. Id.
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from exploiting innovations developed by the licensee. 1'0 This position
reflects the Commission's effort to promote technological develop-
ment through economic incentives. 191 Further, by prohibiting an
obligation to transfer a license to use improvements which extends
longer than the period of the original license, the Commission en-
hances the licensees bargaining position upon the termination of the
agreement. 192 A licensee interested in further development of the
knowhow may bargain for further use of the knowhow by offering
the licensor a license to exploit improvements developed by the
licensee.' 93
The licensee may also benefit from the establishment of a terri-
torially-based production network. The regulation allows the parties
to refrain from active and passive competition in another licensee's
contract territory: 194 In the Commission's view, the major investment
required for technologically new or improved products creates a
greater need to offer a licensee security to develop a market within
the contract territory. 95 Therefore, licensees can develop a territorial
market completely free from competition by firns using the licensor's
technology.
C. Implications of the Knowhow Regulation for Technology
Transfers in the Community
The knowhow regulation addresses the interests of both purchasers
and sellers of technology exploitation rights. Under the regulation,
licensees purchasing rights to exploit knowhow benefit from limita-
tions on the licensor's power to prevent application of innovations.
196
As well, the licensee profits from the Commission's approval of bans
on competition in the licensee's contract territory.' s9 The licensor,
however, may exert a high degree of control over the exploitation of
the knowhow and realize significant economic benefit from knowhow
190. Id. at 12,194. The licensee must, however, refrain from disseminating improvements





194. Id. at 12,193.
195. Id.
196. See supra the text accompanying notes 190-93 (text examining licensee's rights to
exploit innovations).
197. See supra the text accompanying notes 194-96 (discussion of noncompetition obliga-
tions).
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licensing. By limiting fields of application, the licensor can grant
exploitation rights to firms best adapted to improving particular
applications and increase the prospects for development of successful
innovations 98 For each new application, the licensor can collect
additional royalties.' 99 Further, the regulation extends protection to
the licensor's investment interest by permitting the payment of roy-
alties throughout the period the knowhow remains secret and for a
limited time after the knowhow enters the public domain.m When
combined with the existing support structure for technological in-
novation, the legal certainty provided by the regulation creates an
attractive Community market for the purchase and sale of rights to
exploit technology.
Andrew Hay
198. See supra the text accompanying notes 188-89 (analysis of licensor's ability to control
exploitation by limiting fields of application).
199. Id.
200. See supra the text accompanying notes 184-87 (explanation of economic value of
knowhow after disclosure).
